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Alexander GOGUN, Stalinskie kommandos, Ukrainskie partizanskie formirovanija
1941‑1944, Moscou : ROSSPEN (2e éd., rev. et aug.), 2012, 527 p.
1 The Ukrainian partisan movement did not see substantial historical research yet, as
Alexander Gogun correctly points out in his 2012 published second Russian edition of
his book on partisan warfare in the Ukraine1 during the Second World War. In Soviet
times a sincere treatment of the problematic could not be delivered due to restricted
access to archives within the USSR and ideological boundaries. Publications by German
and  American  historians  were  not  restrained  by  axioms,  but  because  of  a  broader
setting a detailled account of the partisan warfare in the Ukraine could not be given.
Only recently some Ukrainian historians2 started to adress the “painful points” of the
history of the “Great Patriotic War,” but were unable to cover the whole range of open
questions  and could  not  give  answers  formulated  on  a  substantial  basis  of  sources
drawn from different archives.
2 Gogun´s  book  closes  the  gap.  While  Belarus  and  the  partisan  formations  there  are
already well researched, now the Ukraine too is examined in detail. What makes the
authors book different from publications like for example Kenneth Slepyan´s work on
Soviet partisans during the Second World War3 is the consultation of a vast diversity of
sources in five languages, including German, Ukrainian and Polish. Where experts like
Bogdan Musial seem to get lost in describing every minute detail of events,4 Gogun´s
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book  “Stalinskie  kommandos”  delivers  conclusive  generalisations  and  deductions,
while each chapter´s caption presents core thesises to the reader.
3 Gogun did not only use memoirs and published documents for his research, but also
draws on sources archived in Germany, Ukraine, Poland and Russia. The fact, that in
the  Ukraine  two  powerful  anti‑Soviet  movements  also  reported  on  incidents,  adds
another type of sources to the available German and Soviet documents.
4 The author covers practically all aspects of historical questions about the Ukrainian
partisan  units.  Introducing  the  reader  into  the  topic  by  clarifying  the  process  of
organisation, Gogun then outlines the history of partisan warfare during the years of
occupation in a  condensed form. The chapter about the main tasks of  the partisan
detachments includes not only military operations and diversion, but also investigates
the partisans´ activities in the fields of reconnaissance, propaganda and terrorism. The
formations and their members are examined in detail,  providing historians with an
adequate  assessment  of  the social  background  of  the  irregular  fighters  and  their
psychological constitution. Fortunately Gogun does not dodge uncomfortable questions
and research areas, but instead openly adresses the common disciplinary shortcomings
of the partisan units and the widespread inner conflicts.
5 The  resulting  investigation  of  the  Ukrainian  partisans  constitutes  a  valuable
contribution to the historiography of the Second World War. While the book has been
written strictly according to scientific rules, owing to a journalistic style it stays highly
readable. Being rich in detail it not only provides complementing information about
omitted  research  areas  but  in  fact  convincingly  corrects  outdated  distortions  and
persistent misinterpretations. Gogun has in some cases been accused of denouncing the
Ukrainian partisan movement by selective usage of sources5, but this is definitely not
the case. To the contrary, the abundance of evidence supports no other conclusion than
labelling the described characteristics of the Ukrainian partisan formations as accurate
and  typical.  On  the  other  hand  Gogun  repeatedly  succeeds  in  pointing  out  false
accusations against the Soviet partisans that were even repeated in documents of the
German invaders (p. 87, 185).
6 The Ukrainian partisan formations did not spring into existance spontanously due to
rebellion of the people against Nazi rule, but instead these groups were organized by
central Soviet governmental organs. The secret services of the Soviet Union played a
major  and  decisive  role  in  the  permanent  kindling  of  resistance  and  conflicts.
Consequently Gogun decided to characterize these Red partisans not as “insurgents”
but  choses  the  indeed  more  adequate  term of  “commandos.”  Three  groups  can  be
distiguished, the small specialised squads of the secret service sent out with orders for
diversion  and  terrorisation,  military  groups  assigned  with  reconnaissance  and  the
actual partisan saboteur detachments, that were composed of former Soviet soldiers
left behind in the rear of the Wehrmacht, locals and Soviet officials.
7 The self‑proclaimed “people‘s resistance” set themselves apart from those who they
allegedly fought for and saw themselves as a military formation operating in the enemy
´s rear.
8 Their ruthlessness became visible instantly, when from the first day they applied the
tactics of “scorched earth.” In the countryside for example this meant the destruction
of agricultural economy, including even the attempt to destruct forests by fire. The
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cities of the occupied territory suffered too. The fate of the people living in the Ukraine
was not taken into account.
9 Instead of erroneously interpreting the Soviet side as a mere object of events, what
Soviet historians did when they presented the Soviet partisans as a reaction to the
appearance  of  the  German enemy (therefore  the  label  “people´s  avengers”),  Gogun
describes the partisan as a structure with its own initial aims, tactics and strategies. Of
course  the  author  also  stresses  repeatedly  the  extreme  savagery  of  the  invaders
(p. 17‑21),  also  mentioning  the  Hungarian  behaviour  (p. 87,  123).  According  to  the
researcher,  German readiness  for  cruelty  that  rooted in  tradition in  the  1940s  was
combined with the incredibly furious racism of national‑socialism (p. 124). The Soviet
saboteurs and terrorists perfectly understood this new quality and successfully used it
to  their  own  ends,  deliberately  provoking  repressions  of  the  aggressors  against
civilians.
10 Fighting the foreign German occupier of the Ukraine was a major assignment too, but
rather  difficult  to  accomplish.  Open  battle  led  to  unbearable  casualties,  but  petty
diversion showed little effective results. Gogun points out, that the « Fascist » losses in
manpower due to partisan acticity in fact were much lower than officially announced.
Furthermore half of the death toll consisted of locals who fought the partisans in the
ranks of the different units compiled by the German invaders. After the summer of
1942 the Ukrainian « commandos » seem to have concentrated more on sabotaging the
railway  system  in  the  rear  of  the  Wehrmacht.  Although  the  partisans  had  every
opportunity to do serious damage to the German war machine,  the effects  of  their
diversions  remained  negligible.  They  could  not  even provide  the  Soviet  army with
significant  up‑to‑date  reconnaissance.  In  order  to  cover  up  their  inefficiency,  they
reported grossly exaggerated figures about their operations. Like all Soviet partisans,
the  Ukrainian partisans  were  not  professionals.  They  were  not  less  devoted to  the
Soviet system than their Belorussian or Russian brethren, loyalty towards the Soviet
regime being the same for all Soviet partisans.
11 Terrorism was among the tasks of the Ukrainian partisans too. And not surprisingly the
irregular activity of the Soviet commandos in the Ukraine always was accompanied by
a significant level of terror. Murdering German prisoners of war was a common war
crime endorsed by the Soviet command, but ultimate violence was also directed against
anyone else who was identified as an “enemy.” Nationalist “traitors” could not expect
mercy.
12 The  distinct  style  in  which  the  Soviet  partisans  fought  becomes  especially  obvious
when the struggles in the Ukraine are compared to the other two irregulare formations
acting there, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Polish Home Army. The nationalist
movement exercised ethnical terror and killed civilians in high numbers. The Soviet
partisans in contrast showed some kind of distinct “class terror” which demanded less
victims, according to the author. The Red partisans did not think in ethnical categories
when it came to their mass terror and even went as far as annihilating whole Ukrainian
villages,  if  those  were  located  in  Western  Ukraine  and  under  suspection  to  be
“nationalist.” In contrast, the Central and Eastern Ukraine did not experience these
extreme acts of retaliations from Soviet partisans. But Soviet irregular strategy was far
from protecting the people all the same.
13 The partisan formations were poorly supplied with provisions and mainly relied on
requisitions  to  obtain  food  and  clothing.  In  addition  to  this  practice  unthoughtful
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plunder or outright robbery was committed repeatedly by individual partisans. Moral
as  well  as  discipline  were  low.  A  multitude  of  sources  reports  pillaging,  excessive
drinking and rape. The Red partisans alienated the Ukrainian population, which lead to
volunteers in the ranks of the formations being a minority. Most men had to be drafted
forcefully.  The  inner  relationship  between  the  partisans  of  one  unit  was
correspondingly strained. The rude atmosphere was characterized by distrust and fear,
strict surveillance, subjection and brutal lawlessness.
14 While  operating  in  the  rear  of  the  German Wehrmacht  the  different  partisan
formations did not cooperate as this might be expected, but instead very often rather
clashed. Since the different “commandos” answered to different Soviet organisations,
cooperation was not paramount. Instead competition arose which lead to inefficiency
and  other  negative  side‑effects.  But  even  commanders  administrated  by  the  same
authorities  often  stood  in  conflict  with  each  other.  Furthermore  there  were
disagreements with superiors about e.g. operational approaches.
15 These extreme phenomens of  partisan warfare often are  excused by simply stating
“war is war,” but Gogun rejects this kind of primitive evasion. He also negates, that the
brutality of the irregular war in the occupied Ukrainian was kindled by the German
methods of warfare and the Nazi occupational regime exclusively. Even the explanation
of  mutual  escalation  and  radicalisation  seems  to  be  unsufficiant.  Gogun  instead
identifies Stalin´s distinct style of conducting irregular warfare as a major factor. A
fighting  militant  Stalinism  contributed  crucially  to  trigger  a  merciless  war  of
destruction in the Ukraine during the years of occupation 1941‑1944.
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